Effect of transaction costs on market participation among smallholder cassava farmers in Central Madagascar by Okoye, B.C. et al.
Okoye et al., Cogent Economics & Finance (2016), 4: 1143597
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2016.1143597
ECONOMETRICS | RESEARCH ARTICLE
Effect of transaction costs on market participation 
among smallholder cassava farmers in Central 
Madagascar
B.C. Okoye1*, A. Abass2, B. Bachwenkizi2, G. Asumugha1, B. Alenkhe2, R. Ranaivoson3,  
R. Randrianarivelo3, N. Rabemanantsoa3 and I. Ralimanana3
Abstract: High transaction costs deter entry of small farmers into the market. With 
the data from 240 smallholder cassava farmers in Central Madagascar, this study 
identified strategies to promote successful smallholder commercialization. The 
coefficients for membership of cooperatives, native of community and farming 
experience, have a direct relationship with decision to participate in the market and 
which is significant at 1% level and road condition to the nearest town is good at 
10% level. The coefficients for age, distance to the nearest town and distance from 
the farm to the market have an indirect relationship with decision to participate in 
the market and significant at 5, 10 and 1% levels, respectively. The results also show 
that the coefficients for personal means of transportation and marketing experi-
ence have a direct relationship with decision to sell cassava off-farm and at 10 and 
1% level of significance, respectively, while distance to the nearest town and dis-
tance from the farm to the market had an indirect relationship with decision to sell 
off-farm at 5% level of significance each and cost of transportation at 1% level. The 
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study raises policy issues which might reduce these transaction costs by providing 
more market outlets, better rural infrastructure and also bulking centres.
Subjects: Economics, Finance, Business & Industry; Environment & Agriculture;  
Environmental Studies & Management
Keywords: rural infrastructure; triple hurdle and Heckman selection
1. Introduction
Cassava (Manihot esculenta Crantz) is an important staple food and cash crop in several tropical 
African countries, where it plays a principal role in food economies. In Madagascar, cassava leaves 
and roots are treated as edibles, with the roots mainly used to make tapioca and candy. However, 
cassava itself is mainly used as animal feed, though is very important as it serves as a buffer crop 
during lean times. Dried cassava is mostly consumed in the southern part of the country which ex-
ports cassava to neighbouring islands, but increase in freight and shipping costs eventually made it 
unprofitable (Fenohasina, 2007).
Total world cassava utilization is projected to reach 275 m by 2020 (IFPRI in Westby, 2008), with 
some researchers estimating that the number will be closer to 291 m (Scott, Rosegrant, & Ringler, 
2000 in Westby, 2008). Africa is the world’s largest producer of cassava, with Nigeria leading with 
34.17% of the continent’s market share. Madagascar produces about 3.11 m of cassava per annum, 
which is about 1.12, 1.97 and 8.57% of the World’s, Africa’s and Eastern Africa’s total output, respec-
tively (FAO Statistics, 2013). Cassava yields can be quite high, as high as 25–40 t/ha, although na-
tionally, yields are often well below these levels. The world’s, Africa’s and Eastern Africa’s average 
yields are 13.34, 11.14 and 0.97 t/ha, respectively, while in Madagascar the average yield is 0.65 t/ha 
(FAO, 2013).
In Africa, most cassava is used for food consumption purposes, and opportunities for commercial 
development remain largely undeveloped, in contrast to the other major cassava producing regions 
such as Asia and South America. Insufficient processing options for stored roots, inadequate mar-
keting channels and poor linkages between producers and end users are the major factors prevent-
ing greater profitability among producers and processors in Africa (IITA, IITA., 2004). The fact that 
fresh cassava is both perishable as well as very voluminous determines the behaviour of each group 
and participant in the cassava market. Local processing and transportation are key services that 
need to be performed efficiently, and represent key issues within the African cassava value chain 
(Knipsheer et al., 2007).
Fresh cassava roots—which have a water content of about 70%—are bulky and so expensive to 
transport, especially over long distances. The roots are also perishable, and begin to deteriorate 
soon after harvest. These product features have a profound bearing on the trade network for the 
roots. For instance, the bulky nature of the fresh roots makes the market for them more localized; 
focused as it is around the production centres (and unlike the processed cassava products which 
have a wider market coverage geographically). Also, the perishability of the roots means their mar-
keting activities cover a much shorter time frame than those for other cassava products (Ezedinma, 
Sanni, & Okechukwu, 2007).
Promoting market-orientation among agricultural producers in developing countries, and particu-
larly among smallholder farmers, is pivotal for the development of effective agribusiness value 
chains, those that can supply adequate food. Such a move involves improving the production and 
marketing processes for and capacity of income generating processes among resource-poor farm-
ers (Otieno, Omiti, Nyanamba, & McCullough, 2009). The functioning of food markets in many devel-
oping countries is hampered by the high costs of market exchange (Bassolet, 2000; Lutz, 1994). The 
relative magnitudes of these transaction costs depend on farmers’ access to infrastructure facilities, 
and particularly roads ( Akramov, 2009), for limited or poor quality road and rail links inhibit timely 
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access to inputs, increase input costs and decrease access to output markets, thereby reducing the 
transmission of market signals (Dayo, Nkonya, Pender, & Oni, 2009).
The issue of how farmers come to the decision on whether to sell at the farm gate or to transport 
their produce to the market has received little attention in the literature. This is surprising from a 
policy perspective because the livelihoods of many poor farmers across the world depend on the sale 
of agricultural commodities for export. Fu, Epperson, Terza, and Fletcher (1988), Fletcher and Terza 
(1986) and Edelman, Schmiesing, and Olsen (1990) have all shown that farmer characteristics influ-
ence farmers’ choices on which sales mechanisms to use; however, little has been written on what 
drives farmers’ decisions on this in developing countries.
In developing countries, smallholder farmers find it difficult to participate in the market due to the 
presence of a range of constraints and barriers which reduce their incentives to participate. Such 
decisions may be reflected in hidden costs that make access to markets and productive assets dif-
ficult ( Makhura, Kirsten, & Delgado, 2001). Transaction costs, that is, the observable and non-ob-
servable costs associated with exchange, act as the key barriers to market participation for resource 
poor smallholders (Coase, 1960; Delgado, Rosegrant, Steinfeld, Ehui, & Courbois, 1999; Holloway, 
Nicholson, Delgado, Staal, & Ehui, 2000; Makhura et al., 2001), and poor infrastructure often in-
creases such market transaction costs (Takeshima, 2008). Meanwhile, the policy analyses carried 
out thus far on market participation and supply decisions have left considerable scope for further 
econometric inquiry to take place (Lapar, Holloway, & Ehui, 2003). If transactions costs are high, they 
need to be measured and explained. de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) have argued that attempting to 
observe them directly will always underestimate their importance, quite likely by large amounts. 
Their study showed; however, that such costs can be derived from observed behaviour. However, to 
do this requires models to be constructed in which behaviour is specified. Transaction costs reflect 
the character of the market, but are mainly embedded in household characteristics and their eco-
nomic environment (Gabre-Madhin, 1999; Holloway et al., 2000; Makhura et al., 2001).
The triple-hurdle model has been applied very little in order to model agricultural commodity sup-
ply decisions, and this paucity of use is somewhat surprising. Barriers to entry, whether they be 
perceived or real, are significant impediments for expanding the density of market participation 
(Stiglitz, 1989). By examining how small-scale cassava farmers sell their output, we hope to throw 
some light on how transaction cost levels affect farmers in poor countries. In contrast to farmers in 
developed countries, who often have large farms and enjoy good institutions and infrastructure, 
most farmers in developing countries are very small in scale and geographically isolated, and so 
beyond the reach of formal market institutions (Fafchamps & Hill, 2005). For them, interacting with 
the market is fraught with difficulty and danger, thereby restricting their agricultural activities to 
subsistence use only (Fafchamps, 1992 and Key, Sadoulet, & de Janvry, 2000). There has also been 
little work published on the use of the triple hurdle model, especially in relation to market participa-
tion decisions, unlike the double hurdle model which has been used more extensively.
2. The Concept of Transaction Costs
Two broad categories of transaction costs—proportional and fixed transaction costs—can be identi-
fied in the literature (Key et al., 2000). Some researchers have broken-down transaction costs into 
tangible costs (such as transportation, communications and legal costs) and intangible costs (such 
as levels of uncertainty and moral hazard) (Cuevas & Graham, 1986; Holloway et al., 2000; Birthal, 
Joshi, & Gulati, 2005). Key et al. (2000) made the distinction between fixed or lump sum transaction 
costs on the one hand, and variable, proportional or per-unit transaction costs on the other. They 
showed that both fixed and variable transaction costs impact on market participation levels, where-
as supply decisions (the amounts sold)—conditional on market participation, only depend on varia-
ble transaction costs.
Most of the previous empirical studies on this topic have used the joint decision model of market 
participation (using both fixed and proportional transaction costs) and the amounts transacted 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
05
.11
2.3
9.1
12
] a
t 1
2:1
5 1
8 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
16
 
Page 4 of 20
Okoye et al., Cogent Economics & Finance (2016), 4: 1143597
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2016.1143597
(which depend on the proportional transaction costs) to identify the presence and level of these two 
types of transactions cost ( Vakis, Sadoulet, & de Janvry, 2003). Goetz (1992); meanwhile, identified 
the presence of transaction costs by highlighting some of their determinants as regressors in market 
participation and quantity transacted equations, used for the peanut market in Senegal. As did 
Skoufias (1995) for the land rental market in Peru and Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Benjamin (1998) for 
the labour market in rural Mexico.
Takeshima (2008); meanwhile, adhered to the conventional Heckman sample selection approach 
for the following reasons. The stochastic threshold approach used by Key et al. (2000) requires that 
prices are reported for all observations, and this did not match with the data-set used by Takeshima, 
which reported prices only for sellers and buyers. The Bayesian approach offered by Holloway, 
Barrett, and Ehui (2005) can be complex when applied to estimations using dual selection criteria, 
which Takeshima focused on. Also, the studies of Key et al. (2000) and Vakis et al. (2003) employed 
models in which the unobserved proportional transaction costs are approximated as linear functions 
of a set of explanatory variables, including reported proportional transaction costs (PTCs). While Key 
et al. (2000) simply added those PTC-related explanatory variables to the structural equation, Vakis 
et al. (2003) regressed the reported PTCs on to other PTC-related explanatory variables, to obtain 
predicted PTCs. Henning and Henningsen (2007) followed Key et al. (2000), although referring to 
Vakis et al. (2003) when selecting PTC-related variables. Takeshima, (2008) followed Key et al. (2000) 
by arguing that their approach is more robust when using the functional form of PTCs, and that the 
estimation routine is less complicated.
Complementing this approach, some studies have analysed the transaction costs that enter into 
idiosyncratic price formation, with Escobal (Escobal D’Angelo, 2000) using a hedonic price equation 
among a household sample in Peru, and Staal, Delgado, and Nicholson (1997), the same among milk 
producers in Kenya and Ethiopia, Park, Jin, Rozelle, and Huang (2002) identifying price differentials 
across a number of Chinese provinces, and Minten and Kyle (1999) surveying traders in Kinshasa.
Proportional and fixed transaction costs can be separately identified, even when they share the 
same determinants, through the estimation of a minimum threshold level for the transactions, as 
implied by the presence of fixed transaction costs. This is done by estimating a censored regression 
using an unobserved threshold, as Cogan (1981) did among married female workers in the USA, Key 
et al. (2000) and Makhura et al. (2001) did for the corn market in Mexico and South Africa, respec-
tively, and Henning and Henningsen (2007) applied to labour markets in Midwest Poland. The last 
study provided a measure for proportional transaction costs, but only revealed the presence and 
determinants of fixed transaction costs, without taking them into account within the calculation. 
Finally, one can choose between different markets with different transaction cost structures to re-
veal the role these costs play in the making of market choices, as Hobbs (1997) did for the cattle 
market in the USA.
2.1. Theoretical Framework
We identified the theoretical model that best describes the behaviour of the study for cassava farm-
ers, and this guided our empirical analysis. To formally derive this model, we started with the market 
participation decision, and followed this with the traditional model described by Key et al. (2000), 
Bellamare and Barrett (2006), Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004), Makhura et al. (2001), 
Holloway et al. (2005), Takeshima (2008) and Burke (2009). All these studies posit that a representa-
tive agent will maximize his or her utility (2.1) subject to (2.2) through (2.4).
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Subject to
 
 
 
 
In Equation 2.1, u is the agent’s utility as a function of a vector of his or her consumption c. Equation 2.2 is 
the budget constraint, and this is where the role of transaction costs is introduced. Here, pjm is the market 
price of good j, and mj is the quantity of good marketed, which is positive for sellers and negative for buyers. 
The agent’s role in the market is represented by two indicator functions: 훿sj  is 1 for sellers of good j, and 0 
otherwise, and 훿bj  is 1 for buyers of good j and 0 otherwise. Note the additional, important condition:
 
This last condition establishes m as the net quantity marketed, by stating that a household cannot 
be both a buyer and seller during the same period. In this equation, the proportional transaction 
costs for sellers of good j, tspj, and the fixed transaction costs for sellers of good j, t
s
fj, effectively 
change the price they receive and; thus, their market behaviour. Similarly, the proportional transac-
tion costs for buyers of good j, tbpj, effectively change the price they pay and so their market behav-
iour also. However, as the authors point out in their separate studies, these transaction costs are 
largely unobserved within the survey data, and so are represented as a function of those more read-
ily enumerable factors able to explain them, these being zst  and z
b
t , respectively. One of the reasons 
why transactions costs are such an important element in this model, is their role in explaining the 
level of self-sufficiency seen among producers. The inclusion of non-market transfers, T, which can 
be positive or negative, completes this constraint.
Equation 2.3 is a feasibility constraint which indicates that for any good j, the amount consumed, 
cj, the amount marketed mj and the amount used as an input, nj, cannot exceed the amount pro-
duced, qj and the endowment Aj.
Equation 2.4 describes the relationship between inputs, nj, and outputs, through the use of production 
technology G, and considering other supply shifters, zq. Recall that by this stage, production decisions re-
garding nj have already been made, so we take nj as a given. Traditionally, specifications of zq have been 
limited primarily to community level characteristics, such as the proportion of local farmers using fertilizer 
or hybrid seeds, as in Burke (2009), and endowments over which the household has little control, such as 
age of the household head and/or the amount of land cultivated, as with Key et al. (2000).
Indirect utility functions are derived from Equation 2.4, leading to market quantity functions, as in 
Key et al. (2000) and Burke (2009), arriving at the decision rules:
 
 
(2.1)Max u(c)
(2.2)
2∑
t=0
K∑
j=1
{[(pmj − t
s
pj)I
offfram
j (z
s
t )(훿
s
j ) + (p
m
j I
onfarm
j + (p
m
j + t
b
pj)I
buyer
j
(zbt )(훿
b
j )]mj − t
s
fj(z
s
t )훿
s
j
− tbfj(z
b
t )훿
b
j + T} = 0
(2.3)qj − nj + Aj −mj − cj = 0, j = 1,… , J
(2.4)G(q, n, zq) = 0
(2.5)cj , qj , nj ≥ 0
(2.6)훿sj + 훿
b
j ≤ 1
(2.7)ms = q − c = ms(z
s
t ,n, p
m, T,A), for net sellers, and
(2.8)mb = c − q = mb(z
b
t ,n, p
m, T,A), for net buyers
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Notice that, like Bellemare and Barrett (2006) and Key et al. (2000), empirically we separate the posi-
tive and negative values of the marketed quantity into two non-negative variables for net purchases 
mb, and net sales ms. Allowing quantities to be determined by separate processes. This makes the 
model used here more flexible than if we were to use a switching regression, like Goetz (1992).
It is important to note that there are three time periods: t = 0, t = 1 and t = 2, and in each of these 
periods there is a corresponding utility measure u(c). During period t = 0; for example, a producer 
chooses one regime out of two, namely to sell by participating in the market or not to sell based on 
the relevant farmer or market characteristics. The producer, after deciding to become a seller, de-
cides to choose t = 1; whether to be an on-farm seller or an off-farm seller, based on some charac-
teristics of himself or the market. The seller decides on the quantity to produce and the inputs used 
based on the expected cassava price and input costs during t = 2. If the seller makes decisions se-
quentially, then IRcassava, 0  =  I
R
cassava and 1  =  I
R
cassava, 2, with I
S
cassava, 1  =  I
S
cassava, 2 and qcassava,0  = 
 mcassava,0 = qcassava,1 = mcassava and 1 = 0. I
S
cassava, 0 remaining undefined, since a producer does not decide 
which seller to be before deciding whether to be a seller at all in period t = 0. Therefore, the regime 
choices are made only in t = 0 and t = 1, while cassava production, sales and consumption choices 
are made only in t = 2.
3. Methodology
3.1. The Study Area
Madagascar is the largest island in Africa and the fourth largest in the world. With a size of 587,040 
sq km, it is approximately twice the size of Arizona and has limited freshwater resources, as water 
covers only about 1% of the total land surface ( FEWSNET, 2012). Agriculture in Madagascar is heav-
ily influenced by rainfall, which is generally abundant along the whole of the east coast, decreases 
sharply moving into the highlands, and falls to less than 500 mm per year in the south and south-
west. The first rains arrive in October or November. The cropping calendar varies greatly from region 
to region and according to the different climatic conditions, soils and altitude found in each. Food 
crop production is the most important agricultural sub-sector, accounting as it does for around 75% 
of the cultivated area. Rice is the staple food, and rice paddies cover 1.34 million hectares through-
out the country—with the exception of some semi-arid areas in the south and south-west—under 
both rain-fed and irrigated systems. Other food crops grown include; maize (mainly in the south and 
central-east regions, cassava, sorghum (in the south), beans, groundnut, sweet potatoes and a wide 
variety of vegetables. Nonetheless, the risk-coping strategies used by farmers, including the use of 
cassava as an energy-giving food, are insufficient to make the farmers food secure (Harvey et al., 
2014; Ramaroson Rakotosamimanana, Arvisenet, & Valentin, 2014), and cassava farmers—similar 
to other farmers—suffer significant losses due to recurrent cyclones.
3.2. Sampling Procedure
A multistage randomized sampling technique was used to select 240 cassava farmers for detailed 
study. During the first stage, six districts were randomly selected from Central Madagascar, these 
being Moramanga, Betafo, Ambalavao, Soavinandriana, Analamanga and Vakinankara. These dis-
tricts are located along the western coast near the Mozambique Channel and along a transverse 
section of the country which runs through the central region and on to the east coast (Figure 1). 
During the second stage, two communes were randomly selected from each district, giving a total 
of 12 communes, then for the last stage, 20 farmers were randomly selected from each commune, 
giving a total of 240 farmers. Primary data was collected with the aid of a well-structured question-
naire (Figure 2).
3.3. Analytical Procedures
In order to develop the conceptual framework, the following estimation procedure was used.
The market participation equation and seller-type equation by the use of the linear probability 
model each. The level of participation for on-farm and off-farm sellers, and for all the participants, 
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was calculated using the Heckman selectivity model, following Makhura (2001). These models are 
specified as follows;
 
 
 
(2.9)Probit(seller,non-seller)
i
= b0 + biXi + ui
(2.10)Probit(seller type)
i
= a0 + aiXi + ui
(2.11)Cassava value(seller type) = 훼o + 훼iXi + ui
Figure 1. Graphic illustration 
of the three-tiered market 
participation model.
Producers
Stage 1: Probit model 
Sellers Non-sellers
Stage 2: Probit model
Off-Farm On-Farm
Stage 3:  Heckit
Selectivity model
Quantity Sold Quantity Sold
Figure 2. Map of Madagascar 
showing the survey location.
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where
Probit
(seller,non-seller)
i
 = seller = 1, and Non-Seller = 0
Probit
(seller type)
i
 = probit (on-farm seller = 1, and off-farm seller = 0)
Cassava value
(seller type)
i
 = value of cassava sold in Ar
b0 = constant for market participation equation
a0 = constant for seller-type equation
αo = constant for the level of participation equation
Xi = variables for estimation
bi = vector of parameters to be estimated for market participation
ai = vector of parameters to be estimated for seller type
αi = vector of parameters to be estimated for level of sales
ui = error term
Explicitly,
The market participation equation used was modelled as follows:
 
And,
The seller-type equation for cassava selling households was modelled as follows:
 
where
X1 = membership of cooperatives (dummy variable; I = member, 0 = non member)
X2 = access to communication facilities (dummy variable; 1 = yes, 0 = no)
X3 = Level of education (in years)
X4 = gender (dummy variable; 1 = male, 0 = female)
X5 = age of household head (in years)
X6 = native of community (dummy variable; 1 = native, 0 = otherwise)
X7 = farming experience (in years)
X8 = time to getting paid (days)
X9 = number of times payment requested
X10 = personal means of transportation (dummy variable; 1 = yes, 0 = no)
X11 = distance to nearest town (km)
X12 = distance from the farm to the market (km)
X14 = household size
X15 = road conditions to nearest town (dummy variable; 1 = good, 0 = bad)
X17 = Farm income in Ar
(2.12)
Probit
(seller,non-seller)
= b
0
+ b
1
X
1
+ b
2
X
2
+ b
3
X
3
+ b
4
X
4
+ b
5
X
5
+ b
6
X
6
+ b
7
X
7
+ b
8
X
8
+ b
9
X
9
+ b
10
X
10
+ b
11
X
11
+ b
12
X
12
+ b
14
X
14
+ b
15
X
15
+ b
17
X
17
+ b
18
X
18
+ u
(2.13)
Probit
(sellertype)
= a0 + a10X10 + a11X11 + aX + 12 + a13X13 + a14X14 + a15X15
+ a16X16 + a17X17 + a18X18 + u
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X18 = Cassava yield (t/ha)
b1–b18 = coefficients estimated
a11–a18 = coefficients estimated
Ui = error term
The next procedure identified those factors that influence the amount of cassava sold. It was 
conjectured that variable transaction cost factors influence participation levels. These models were 
estimated using the second stage of selectivity (Heckman) model and involved the inclusion of a 
variable to absorb selectivity bias (Makhura et al., 2001), remembering that the aim of the exercise 
was to identify factors that increase the level of market participation. Ideally, the OLS model is ap-
plicable when all households participate in the market; however, this is rare, as some households 
may prefer not to participate in a particular market, in favour of another one, while others may be 
excluded by market conditions. If the OLS regression is estimated while excluding non-participants 
from the analysis, a sample selectivity bias is introduced into the resulting model. Such a problem is 
overcome by following a two-stage procedure, as suggested by Heckman (1979), or by following the 
Tobit procedure.
The participation levels equation for on-farm (2.14) and off-farm (2.15) cassava sellers in this 
study was specified as follows:
 
 
where
Cassava value
(on-farm)
i
 = value of on-farm cassava sales in Ar
Cassava value
(off-farm)
i
 = value of off-farm cassava sales in Ar
ptcRi  = proportional transaction cost-related variables, as in Equation 2.13
uhi  = error term
Explicitly, the participation equation for cassava sellers was modelled as follows:
 
where
X11–X18 = variables, as modelled in Equation 2.13
α11–α18 = estimated coefficients
u = error term
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Characteristics of the Cassava Producers
The data in Table 1 describe the characteristics of the cassava producers in Central Madagascar. Among the 
240 cassava producing households were 161 sellers (93 off-farm and 68 on-farm), and 79 who do not par-
ticipate in the market. The empirical results support a generally held belief that transaction costs are a 
(2.14)Cassava value(on-farm)
i
= 훼
h
0 + ptc
R
i + u
h
i
(2.15)Cassava value(off-farm)
i
= 훼
h
0 + ptc
R
i + u
h
i
(2.16)
Cassava value
(seller type)
= 훼0 + a10X10 + 훼11X11 + 훼12X12 + 훼13X13 + 훼14X14 + 훼15X15 + 훼16X16
+ 훼17X17 + 훼18X18 + u
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Table 1. Characteristics of the survey households, by market participation status
Note: Field Survey, 2011; numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Variable description Seller (participants) Non-seller 
(non-participants)
Total
Off-farm On-farm
Number of observations 93 68 79 240
Information and Search Costs Related
% with membership of a cooperative societies 28.41 17.89 2.66 16.32
% with access to communication facilities 62.14 50.16 13.16 41.82
Education in years 6.72 5.91 6.15 6.26
(3.35) (3.12) (3.28) (3.25)
Bargaining and negotiation costs related
% of male respondents 28.16 42.33 61.36 43.95
Age in years 40.11 48.35 49.79 46.05
(10.31) (15.12) (15.19) (13.54)
% who are native of the community 88.36 83.12 85.35 85.61
Farming experience in years 15.14 10.28 12.71 12.71
(13.01) (8.02) (3.66) (8.23)
Monitoring and enforcement costs related
Time to get paid in days 3.10 7.12 5.71
(2.19) (5.87) (4.03)
Number of times payment requested 1.21 5.35 3.28
(0.64) (3.66) (2.15)
% who trust the buyer 52.15 98.67 75.11
Proportional transaction costs related
% that have personal means of transportation 48.91 15.72 32.75 32.46
Distance from the farm to the market 2.31 9.47 5.89
(1.11) (11.99) (6.55)
Distance to the nearest town (km) 3.74 12.15 8.41 8.10
(5.81) (15.71) (14.34) (12.62)
Household size 5.12 5.87 6.02 5.67
(2.02) (2.05) (6.25) (3.44)
Cassava marketing experience in years 10.11 10.35 10.23
(5.23) (6.39) (5.81)
Farm income (Ar) 691,201 352,583 521,892
(920,001) (723,805) (821,903)
% with road connections to the nearest town is good 36.28 39.71 39.24 38.41
Farm size (ha) 0.26 0.49 0.06 0.27
(0.15) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Yield (t/ha) 2.61 2.93 2.59 2.71
(1.31) (1.52) (2.63) (1.82)
Quantity sold (t) 1.49 1.87 1.68
(1.22) (1.40) (1.31)
Quantity consumed (t) 0.37 0.90 1.43 0.90
(0.06) (0.52) (0.26) (0.28)
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significant deterrent to market participation among agricultural households (Renkow et al., 2004). This, by 
itself, is not surprising, and can be inferred by simply noting the substantial number of households in the 
sample that sell cassava at the farm gate (on-farm) rather than sell at the market (off-farm).
Table 1 also reveals the following picture of cassava producing households in the data-set. Majority 
(62.14%) of off-farm sellers have access to communication facilities, and have about 7 years of for-
mal training, while only 28.41% are members of cooperative societies. The on-farm sellers also have 
about 6 years of formal training; and 50.16 and 17.89% also have access to communication facilities 
and are members of cooperative societies, respectively. Among the non-selling households, 2.66 
and 13.16% are members of cooperative societies and have access to communication facilities, re-
spectively, and have 6 years of education.
Jensen (2007) noted that prior to the availability of mobile phones, the cost of obtaining informa-
tion was so high that agents were not able to engage in optimal arbitrage. Alene et al. (2008), study-
ing the maize market in Kenya, found that access to means of communication has a positive but 
insignificant effect on market participation levels. This, the authors postulated, could be because 
access to a mobile phone is less useful when accessing market information and in facilitating trans-
actions if there is no viable market information service available, which was the case within the 
study area. Soysa (2008), in a study on traceability in the agriculture value chain, showed how farm-
ers in Sri Lanka were able to improve their incomes using a simple mobile phone application to re-
duce waste through a simple feedback system. Here, text messages were sent to the farmers on a 
daily basis, giving details of the number of rejected products and the reasons why they had been 
rejected, so they could take immediate, remedial action. The information and search costs for this 
activity prior to the use of mobile phones had been prohibitively high and had resulted in significant 
losses, both to the processor and the farmer.
Education also matters in terms of reducing the costs of searching for information, such that the 
time taken to process and act on information decreases with education level (Pingali, Khwaja, & 
Meijer, 2005). A higher level of education adds to the intellectual capital stock, which may in turn 
lead to an increased potential for acquiring skills during work activities (Lapar et al., 2003). Also, a 
prevalence of social networks and organizations may substantially reduce transaction costs, as of-
ten such networks ensure that cooperation takes place among farmers over the use of scarce and 
communal resources. Moreover, small-scale farmers may be better placed to understand their local 
environments in a way that ensures the best use of existing resources, and in an environmentally 
sustainable way (Pingali et al., 2005). Farmers that sell at markets (15.14) and at the farm gate 
(10.28) tend to be more experienced, implying that they may be better equipped to negotiate (Vakis 
et al., 2003).
Cassava production in this zone is generally dominated by the use of female labour, except for 
those farms which do not participate in the market, as these are dominated by men (61.36%). The 
male farmers (42.33%) are more likely to sell at the farm gate than their female (28.16%) counter-
parts, who prefer to sell on the market. The transaction costs related to accessing land and credit are 
much more variable for women than for men (Pingali et al., 2005). All the respondents are still of 
working age (average 46.05 years) and most (85.61%) are native to their respective communities.
For an average cassava seller who sells on the market, it takes about three days to get paid if he 
or she sells on credit, and with just one payment request made. However, for those who sell at the 
farm gate, it takes much longer to get paid (seven days), and such farmers may have to request pay-
ment five times. Almost all those who sell at the farm gate (98.67%), and 52.15% of those who sell 
in the market, noted they trust the buyers, and this may explain why it takes longer time for those 
who sell at the farm gate to get paid. This may also imply that those who buy at the farm gate tend 
to be native of their respective communities, or at most from neighbouring communities. Traders are 
mostly native to the region in which they trade, though family or tribal links between sellers and 
buyers are most important; for example, a seller will usually operate in his or her own region, due to 
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an affinity with the language and agricultural systems used, as well as with the geography (Minten 
& Kyle, 1999).
The size of the cassava harvest and farm sizes vary considerably across households. All the re-
spondents have small land holdings (0.27 ha). However, farm gate sellers tend to have more land 
(0.49 ha) when compared to those who sell in the market (0.26) or those who do not sell at all (0.06). 
An average off-farm seller produces 2.61 t/ha of cassava, sells 1.49t and consumes 0.06 t, while an 
average on-farm seller produces 2.93 t/ha of cassava, sells 1.87 t and consumes 0.52 t. On-farm 
sellers have the most land and may prefer to sell cassava at the farm gate as a result of the huge 
transaction costs arising from having to transport such a bulky product.
Since most of the households are located in rural areas, the average distance to the nearest town, 
using a passable road, is 3.74 and 12.15 km for off-farm and on-farm sellers, respectively. On-farm 
selling households are located on average 9.47 km from the nearest market, when compared to 
2.31 km for their off-farm selling counterparts. About 39.24% of the respondents indicated that road 
conditions in the area are good. This might also partly explain why travel and assembly times during 
the wet season are longer, and also illustrates the von Thunen hypothesis. This says that the more 
perishable and higher value a product is, the lower distance it will be transported (Minten & Kyle, 
1999). However, the main reason for the longer travel times in this case is probably because the 
roads are often impassable in the wet season.
4.2. Decisions on Market Participation
Table 2 shows the results of the probit regression analysis for market participation levels among the 
respondents. The goodness-of-fit, measured by the χ2, showed that the explanatory variables in-
cluded in the probit model explain quite well variations in decisions made whether to participate in 
the market or not. The likelihood ratio tests showed that the slope coefficients were significantly 
different from zero for these participation decisions.
The coefficient for membership of cooperative societies was positive and highly significant at a 
1.0% level of probability. Farmers who belong to cooperatives are more likely to participate in the 
market than their counterparts who do not because the information accessible due to membership 
of such cooperatives tends to remove the fixed transaction costs faced by smallholder farmers who 
wish to enter the cassava market. Being a member of an association also allows farmers to gain ac-
cess to the information needed to increase their returns on crop production and marketing activities, 
though membership of an association might be viewed as a club good rather than a public good 
(Boughton et al., 2007).
The gender coefficient was found to be negative and highly significant, at a 1% level. Female-
headed households are more likely to participate in cassava markets than the male-headed house-
holds, and this is in line with the findings of Arega et al. (2007) who studied maize markets in Kenya 
and Makhura (2001) in livestock markets in South Africa. Having a female head increases a house-
hold’s chances of selling its cassava by a greater amount than due to other factors. This implies that 
women are more inclined to sell their cassava than men, a result in contrast to the expected out-
come, but possibly because women are better at bargaining than men. Female farmers also tend to 
experience lower transaction costs since they tend to have more credibility.
The coefficient for age was found to be negative and significant at a 5% level. This indicates that 
increasing age leads to a corresponding decrease in the level of participation in cassava markets by 
farmers, indicating that younger cassava farmers are more likely to participate in cassava markets 
than their older counterparts. Furthermore, young farmers tend to have stronger social network and 
have established a good level of credibility within their network (Makhura et al., 2001).
The coefficient for native of community was found to be positive and significant at a 1% level of 
probability, implying that those native to their communities are more likely to participate in markets. 
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This also suggests that fixed costs such as language barriers or discrimination may constrain the 
ability of non-indigenous or migrant farmers to integrate into some markets (Vakis et al., 2003). It 
has been found that ethnic similarity reduces barriers to communication and cooperation (Rios et 
al., Rios, Masters, & Shively, 2008). The coefficient for farming experience was positive and significant 
at a 1% level of probability, revealing that greater experience (reflecting the ability to negotiate) in-
creases farmers’ participation levels.
Among the variables for proportional transportation costs, the coefficient for distance to the near-
est town was negative and significant at a 10% level, and distance from the farm to the market and 
crop transportation costs were also 1% level of probability each. The coefficient for the condition of 
the road to the nearest town was positive and significant at a 10% level of probability. As a result, 
farmers who have a long distance to travel to the nearest town, and from the farm to the market, 
and who have high crop transportation costs, are more un-likely to participate in the market. Some 
studies have reported that infrastructure such as roads play an influential role in determining mar-
ket participation levels (Boughton et al., 2007; Goetz, 1992; Heltberg & Tarp, 2002; Key et al., 2000 
and Renkow et al., 2004). Poor infrastructure also increases crop transportation costs per km. PTCs 
also reduce when farmers are located close to markets and have access to a good road network.
4.3. Market Participation Decisions by Seller type (Probit)
The empirical results of the probit regression estimates carried out to establish market participation 
levels by the type of seller (on-farm or off-farm) are shown in Table 3. The χ2 was found to be highly 
significant at a 1% level of probability, indicating a probit regression line of best fit. The likelihood 
Table 2. Results of the probit regression analysis for market participation
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Variable Parameter Coefficient Std. error t-value
Constant b0 2.9115 0.4747 6.1327***
Membership of a cooperative X1 0.0382 0.0129 2.9521***
Access to communication facilities X2 −0.1252 0.0767 −1.6310
Education level (years) X3 −2.9751 5.3974 −0.5512
Gender X4 −0.4113 0.1249 −3.2912***
Age (years) X5 −0.0813 0.0311 −2.6118**
Native of the community X6 0.0742 0.0235 3.1571***
Farming experience (years) X7 0.0418 0.0148 2.8113***
Time to getting paid in Days X8 −0.0051 0.1188 −0.0429
Number of times payment requested X9 0.0037 0.1271 0.0291
Personal means of transportation X10 0.2715 2.2776 0.1192
Distance to the nearest town (km) X11 −0.0614 0.0249 −2.4612*
Distance from farm to market (km) X12 −0.0968 0.0233 −4.1521***
Transportation costs (Ar/t) X13 −0.0003 . 0.0008 −3.5732***
Condition of road to the nearest town X15 0.2193 0.0921 2.3811*
Marketing experience (years) X16 0.0831 0.0683 1.2158
Farm income level (N) X17 0.000007 0.000004 1.5941
Yield (t/ha) X18 0.0072 0.0045 1.6027
Log likelihood −285.5902
χ2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.5190
Number of observations 240
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ratio tests indicated that the slope coefficient was significantly different from zero with regard to 
sellers’ decisions on whether to participate in the market or not.
The coefficients for distance to the nearest town and distance from the farm to the market were 
negative and significant at a 5% level of probability and crop transportation costs at a 1% level of 
probability. This indicates that the larger the distance to the nearest town, from the farm to the 
market and from the house to the farm, plus the higher the crop transportation costs, the more likely 
it is that cassava will be sold at the farm gate (on-farm).
As expected, these results suggest that those households located a long way from the nearest 
town, and from the market are more likely to sell their cassava in the farm. This seems plausible, 
since farmers in rural areas do not always have easy access to up-to-date information about mar-
kets, for the simple reason that functional extension offices and marketing institutions tend to be 
located in towns. Also, the greater the distance between the market and the farm, the more likely 
farmers are to sell at the farm gate, due to the significant transactions costs incurred when travel-
ling long distances to the market along poor roads. Such a scenario also tends to increase crop 
transportation costs. Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig (1993) conclude that “the major effect 
of roads is not via their impact on private agricultural investment but rather on marketing opportuni-
ties and reduced transaction costs of all sorts”.
The coefficients for personal means of transportation and marketing experience were found to be 
positive and significant at a 10 and 1% level of probability, respectively. These results imply that hav-
ing a personal means of transportation and long years of marketing experience increases the prob-
ability of a farmer selling cassava at the market. This is expected, since farmers with more marketing 
experience prefer to take their produce to the market, where they may obtain a better price through 
bargaining.
4.4. The Level of Off-Farm Cassava Sales
The second stage of the selectivity model (Heckit or OLS accounting for bias) was used to determine 
those factors influencing the level of off-farm cassava sales (Table 4). The χ2 value was highly signifi-
cant at a 1% level of probability indicating goodness of fit of the probit regression line. Also, the in-
verse mills ratio (lambda) for the level of cassava sales was significant, implying that a sample 
selection bias would have resulted if the level of off-farm sales had been estimated without taking 
into account the decision to participate in the cassava market. The Heckman selection model allows 
us to use information from non-market participants to improve estimates of the parameters gener-
ated by the regression model. The Heckman selection model provides consistent, asymptotically 
efficient estimates for all parameters in the model.
Heckman estimated ρ (rho) as 0.75, the correlation of the residuals in the two equations and sig-
ma (σ = 7.23), the standard error of the residuals of the on-farm equation. In this case, we can reject 
the null scenario, whereby rho = 0, so we should use a sample selection model for this data. Six of 
the nine variables had coefficients significantly different from zero in their direct effects, implying 
that these factors are important in determining cassava sales volumes. The direct and indirect ef-
fects are the outcome and selection equations, respectively.
The coefficients for personal means of transportation and road conditions to the nearest town 
were significant variables, and had a direct relationship with cassava sales, at a 10 and 1% level, 
respectively. These results suggest that an improvement in personal means of transportation by 1% 
will lead to an increase of about 0.25, 1.51 and 1.76% in cassava sales, for those who are already 
selling (on-farm), those participating as off-farm sellers and for all farmers, respectively. A 1% im-
provement in road conditions to the nearest town; meanwhile, will increase sales by 0.84% for those 
already selling, 0.13% for off-farm participants and 0.98% for all households. These results might 
provide a motivation to increase sales through a reduction in variable transaction costs.
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The coefficient for distance to the nearest town was negative and significantly related to the level 
of sales, at a 10% level of probability. Further, a decrease in distance from the household to the near-
est town by a kilometre caused cassava sale levels to increase by 1.15% for those already selling 
(on-farm), 0.61% for off-farm participants and 1.77% for all households. As such, the location of 
farmers with respect to potential markets is an important factor in encouraging those farmers to 
increase their sales (Makhura, 2001). For example, farmers close to urban centres are able to sell 
much of their cassava since they are relatively close to a range of available and accessible marketing 
facilities.
The coefficients for distance from the farm to the market were negative and significant at a 5% 
level of probability for the level of sales, and 1% for all farmers. A 1% decrease in distance from the 
farm to the market increases off-farm sales by 0.14 and 0.17% for all households. It may be that 
farmers who have to travel long distances to their farms prefer to increase their off-farm sales be-
fore returning home, to decrease the transaction costs associated with travelling. A 1% decrease in 
crop transportation costs increased sales by 0.007%, participation levels by 0.01 and 0.02% for all 
households. Increases in variable transaction costs associated with poor infrastructure (mostly road 
and information) led to increases in crop transportation costs per kilometre.
The coefficient for marketing experience was found to be significant at a 5% level of probability for 
sales and off-farm participation levels, and at a 1% level for all farmers. This implies that a 1% in-
crease in marketing experience for off-farm cassava sellers leads to a 1.26, 0.71 and 1.98% increase 
in level of sales, participation levels and among all the households, respectively. This is to be ex-
pected, probably because farmers bargain for better prices at the market than when selling at the 
farm gate.
4.5. Level of On-Farm Cassava Sales
The second stage of the selectivity model (OLS accounting for bias) was estimated to determine 
those significant factors (variable or proportional transaction costs) influencing level of cassava 
sales at the farm gate. The results are presented in Table 5. The χ2 is highly significant at a 1% level 
of probability. The inverse mills ratio was significant at a 1% level of probability, indicating that a 
selectivity bias would result if on-farm cassava sales were estimated without taking into account the 
Table 3. Results of probit regression for market participation decisions, by seller type
*Significant at 10% level of probability.
**Significant at 5% level of probability.
***Significant at 1% level of probability.
Variable Parameter Coefficient Std. error t-value
Constant a0 1.7881 0.1872 9.5543***
Personal means of transportation a10 0.6211 0.2984 2.0814*
Distance to the nearest town (km) a11 −0.2172 0.0815 −2.6651**
Distance from farm to market (km) a12 −0.2913 0.1160 −2.5107**
Transportation costs (Ar/t) a13 −0.0004 0.0001 −3.1132***
Household size a14 −0.3471 0.2195 −1.5815
Condition of road to the nearest town a15 0.0739 0.0734 1.0062
Marketing experience a16 0.0051 0.0015 3.3571***
Farm income levels (Ar) a17 5.8152e−05 3.899e−05 1.4914
Yield (t/ha) a18 0.0013 0.0010 1.2942
Log likelihood −159.8251
χ2 0.0001
Pseudo R2 0.4178
Number of observations 161
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decision to sell cassava. Heckman estimated ρ (rho) as 0.94, the correlation of the residuals in the 
two equations and sigma (σ = 5.1162), the standard error of the residuals of the on-farm equation. 
In this case, we can reject the null hypothesis that rho = 0, so indeed we should be using a sample 
selection model on this data. Three of the eight variables for direct effects had coefficients signifi-
cantly different from zero.
Distance to the nearest town was positive and significant at a 5% level of probability for both the 
direct (sales) and indirect effect (on-farm participation), and at a 1% level for all farmers. These re-
sults suggest that increased distance to the nearest town increases on-farm cassava sales by 0.71%, 
participation levels by 0.40% and 1.22% among households participating in the market. Farmers 
would likely sell more cassava on-farm if the nearest towns were distant, thereby reducing PTCs.
The coefficient for distance from the farm to the market had a positive relationship with cassava 
sales and was significant at a 5% level of probability. This result suggests that increased distance 
from the farm to the market increases on-farm sales by 0.61%, participation levels by 0.25 and 
0.86% among all households. Farmers who travel long distances from their homes to the market 
Table 4. Factors influencing Cassava sales levels (off-farm): Heckit results
*Significant at 10% level of probability.
**Significant at 5% level of probability.
***Significant at 1% level of probability.
Figures in parenthesis are t-values.
Variable Direct Indirect Total
Personal means of transportation 0.2561 1.5135 1.7696
(2.0143*) (2.6218**) (4.6361***)
Distance to the nearest town (km) −1.1590 −0.6152 −1.7742
(−1.6571*) (−2.9173***) (−4.5744***)
Distance from the farm to the market (km) −0.1461 −0.0257 −0.1718
(−2.8214**) (−1.6072) (−4.4286***)
Transportation costs (Ar/kg) −0.0073 −0.0182 −0.0255
(−2.6181**) (−2.5029**) (−5.1210***)
Household size −0.2614 0.3250 −0.0636
(−0.0914) (1.2517) (−1.1603)
Condition of road to the nearest town 0.8472 0.1371 0.9843
(3.2715***) (2.9521***) (6.2236***)
Marketing experience 1.2692 0.7153 1.9845
(2.4790**) (2.5151**) (4.9941***)
Farm income (Ar) 0.000014 5.1730e−05 0.000019
(1.0732) (0.1625) (1.2357)
Yield (t/ha) 0.0061 −0.00019 0.0059
(1.1441) (−1.0027) (0.4383)
Constant 11.5913 2.6142 14.2037
(4.5719***) (2.6731**) (7.2452***)
Ρ 0.7567
λ (Mills’ ratio) 5.4718 (4.2614***)
χ2 0.00001
Σ 7.2310
Number of observations 79 (non participants) 172
93 (off-farm sellers)
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incur significant transaction costs, and so may decide to sell more at the farm gate in other to miti-
gate these costs.
The condition of the road to the nearest town was negatively signed and significant at a 1% level 
of probability. This result suggests that poor road conditions result in a decrease in the level of on-
farm cassava sales by 0.93%, as well as a 0.58% decrease in participation levels and 1.51% among 
all households. Farmers may; therefore, decide to sell more cassava off-farm if road conditions are 
good.
5. Conclusion
Smallholder cassava farming in central Madagascar is characterized by low levels of market partici-
pation. These results support previous studies which have found that the existence of transaction 
costs constrains households in terms of their selling activities. Collectively, these results demon-
strate the importance of allowing for non-negligible fixed costs when carrying out market participa-
tion studies. When these costs are ignored and turn out to be non-negligible, a significant bias 
appears in the participation and sales estimations. Policies that reduce transaction costs through 
improved transportation and the promotion of marketing organizations would increase output; by 
Table 5. Factors influencing cassava sales (on-farm): Heckit results
*Significant at 10% level of probability.
**Significant at 5% level of probability.
***Significant at 1% level of probability.
Figures in parenthesis are t-values.
Variable Direct Indirect Total
Personal means of transportation −0.5113 −0.8124 −1.3237
(−1.2629) (−0.3172) (−1.5801)
Distance to the nearest town (km) 0.7177 0.4049 1.1226
(2.6819**) (2.4912**) (5.1731***)
Distance from the farm to the market (km) 0.6113 0.2519 0.8632 
(2.5917**) (2.6844**) (5.2761***)
Household size 0.4412 0.1825 0.6237
(1.0582) (0.5291) (1.5873)
Condition of the road to the nearest town −0.9352 −0.5825 −1.5177
(−2.9834***) (−2.6719***) (−5.6553***)
Marketing experience 1.5319 0.5140 2.0330
(0.7247) (0.2018) (0.9265)
Farm income (Ar) 0.00009 4.912e−05 0.00009
(1.0051) (0.6103) (1.6154)
Yield (t/ha) 0.0082 0.00026 0.0084
(1.1061) (0.2967) (1.4028)
Constant 15.8143 −6.9731 8.8412
(5.1826***) (−3.7253***) (1.4573)
Ρ 0.9424
λ (Mills’ ratio) 4.8217
(3.5114***) 
χ2 0.00001
Σ 5.1162
Number of observations 79 (non participants) 147
68 (On-farm sellers)
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both increasing market participation and production levels among market participants. In addition, 
improving rural infrastructure (e.g. access roads) would facilitate the faster delivery of farm produce 
(especially perishable commodities such as cassava) to urban consumers. Another critical step in 
generating more marketable surplus would be to facilitate the private sector provision of market 
information via improved telecommunications. In summary, the transaction costs incurred through 
participation and sales could be reduced through the existence of improved information and trans-
portation infrastructure, by the deeper penetration of reputable input distributors, and also the pro-
motion of institutional innovations such as production and marketing cooperatives.
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